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Imperious Caesar, dead and turned to clay, 
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away.
Shakespeare: Hamlet. Act V, Scene 1.
According to most interpretations, one of the central features of Spinoza’s philosophy of 
mind is that ideas are at the same time logical and psychological entities. Ideas receive their 
logical, as well as psychological roles in the same way: both are defined by the causal his-
tory of the idea. While it is certainly true that Spinoza’s philosophy of mind admits only 
one kind of thing, namely modes of thought (Renz forthcoming), conflating the logical 
and psychological roles of ideas naturally leads to identifying epistemology with affectivity. 
On its face, this identification seems to be a natural consequence of Spinoza’s philosophy 
of mind. Every conscious idea that has a psychological role is related to the conatus of the 
subject and thereby qualifies as affective (Marshall 2014; Malinowski-Charles 2009). Also, 
knowledge by definition is an action of the mind and thereby an active affect. If the affec-
tive aspect of an idea and the knowledge claim of that idea are simply different descriptions 
of the same thing, it means that ultimately, truth is just a special kind of feeling.
This identification of truth and affectivity can be reconciled in either of two ways. First, 
by emphasizing that truths are cognitive counterparts of the affective working of our mind. 
There is no mind-independent truth; what we hold to be true is what we feel to be ben-
eficial for us or for our social community (Lenz 2013). Alternatively, by emphasizing that 
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Life and Death in Early Modern Philosophy” con-
ference organized by the British Society for History of Philosophy and the European Society for Early 
Modern Philosophy on 14–16 April 2016. I would like to thank the audience there for their feedback, 
especially Julie R. Klein and Mogens Lærke. I would like to thank Ursula Renz and Gábor Boros for 
their comments on an earlier version of the manuscript, although any errors are my own and should not 
tarnish the reputations of these esteemed persons.
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affects are confused expressions of knowledge claims, wise passions, so to speak. Agreeing 
on reasons for actions entails having the same affective functioning (Sangiacomo 2015a, 
2015b). Therefore, a successful political project can be achieved by aligning our feelings 
just as well as by deliberating about the right policies.
Sangiacomo has argued that this identification of psychological and logical aspects of the 
idea results from Spinoza’s identification of will and intellect entailing the identification of 
certainty and truth: if having an idea and believing the idea is the same thing, then error is 
nothing else than having a confused and obscure idea. In his reading, the ethical intellectualist 
project of the young Spinoza failed because this identification cannot be maintained (cf. Renz 
2015): akratic behavior shows that sometimes knowledge does not guarantee virtuous action. 
Therefore, Spinoza revised his philosophy of mind in the Theological-Political Treatise and the 
Ethics, where ideas have their own power independent of their epistemic status, and therefore, 
inadequate but powerful ideas can defeat less powerful rational ideas (Sangiacomo 2015c). 
Spinoza describes this power of an idea in affective terms (cf. Della Rocca 2003): the power 
with which an idea affects our affective life is the same as the power of the idea with which it 
affects our deliberations and reasoning. This revision of Spinoza’s philosophy is what prompted 
the identification of the psychological and logical aspects of the idea, whereas in Spinoza’s early 
works, ideas were representations automatically qualifying as beliefs and reasons for action, 
where a change in belief entailed a change in representation. In his mature works, ideas are 
representations and reasons for actions, of which the most powerful qualify as beliefs.
In this paper, I argue that accepting this interpretation of Spinoza’s mature philosophy 
on its own does not solve the problem generated by the identification of will and intellect. 
I claim that even if for Spinoza, affectivity and epistemology are the same, and representa-
tions qualify as beliefs, not simply because of their being representations, but because of their 
being the most powerful representations, the problem of ethical intellectualism is preserved. 
Given Spinoza’s identification of epistemology and affectivity reflected in his identification 
of ethical good with usefulness for persevering in being, this ethical intellectualism is mark-
edly different from its usual forms. Since virtue is self-preservation for Spinoza, what is nec-
essary and sufficient for virtue (i.e. having the right kind of ideas) is also necessary and suf-
ficient for self-preservation. Although I am not sure that we can only have the right kind of 
ideas by having knowledge, by having knowledge we necessarily can have the right kind 
of ideas. Given that nothing can follow from our nature that destroys us and that knowledge 
follows from our nature alone, knowledge is always conducive to self-preservation.
This, however, generates an unwelcome consequence for Spinoza: his adherence to 
universal intelligibility combined with this peculiar form of ethical intellectualism rules 
out the necessity of death. This is shown by the difficulties Spinoza faces when trying to 
demonstrate the necessary finitude of human life. As I will show at the end of this paper, 
problems related to this identification are not novel to Spinoza’s philosophy: in the scho-
lastic tradition they were part of the problem of material intellect. Since Spinoza was aware 
of this tradition (Nadler 2001; Klein 2014; Adler 2014), comparing his solutions to the 
traditional ones can help us better understand the genesis and the program of Spinoza’s 
philosophy, and in it the role of what Sangiacomo calls the temptation of the intellect.
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My argument, in short, is that Spinoza embraced all four of the following inconsistent 
claims:
(1) Life is the preservation of one’s essence; death is the destruction of this essence 
brought about by a harmful external cause.
(2) Everything is intelligible: there is no such thing – and therefore no such exter-
nal cause – which an actual human mind cannot, in principle, form an adequate 
idea of.
(3) Ethical intellectualism: of which we form an adequate idea cannot be harmful.
(4) It is necessary that human individuals die.
Claims (1)–(3) imply that knowledge can always avert death, while claim (4) is simply the 
denial of this implication. Since accepting the identification of the logical and epistemo-
logical aspects of the idea leads to this contradiction, these two aspects of the idea have 
to be determined independently, and therefore they both provide independent sources of 
knowledge (Boros 1997).
In section 1, I introduce Spinoza’s definition of death according to which it is the dis-
ruption of the body’s essence by a harmful external cause. In sections 2 and 3, I argue that 
Spinoza indeed embraced universal intelligibility and ethical intellectualism. In section 4, 
I present Spinoza’s demonstration of the necessity of death and argue that he is unable to 
prove it. In section 5, I argue that Spinoza cannot easily reject either ethical intellectualism, 
or universal intelligibility. Therefore, this incoherence is not just the result of the careless ac-
ceptance of a superficial statement, but rather a deeply embedded feature of his philosophy 
of mind. In section 6, I will place this incoherence in a historical context and argue that 
a similar problem existed in the Medieval philosophy of mind which influenced Spinoza.
1.  Definition of Death: Death is the destruction 
of the body’s essence by a harmful external 
cause
The most famous treatment of life and death in Spinoza’s Ethics comes in E4p39,2 where 
Spinoza defined good and evil by the influence external causes have on the proportion of 
motion and rest with which parts of the human body communicate. This proportion is, by 
the definition of the Physical Digression, the essence of the human body: those  external 
2  All references to the English translation of works by Spinoza are from Curley’s edition with the usual 
abbreviation: prae – preface, a – axiom, p – proposition, s – scholium, c – corollary, app – appendix, d – 
definition if it is immediately after the number of the part and demonstration in all other cases. TTP to 
the Theological-Political Treatise followed by the number of chapter and paragraph (Spinoza 1988, 2016).
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causes are good which preserve this essence, or even enhance its power in order to be ca-
pable of doing many things at the same time (cf. Sangiacomo 2013). On the other hand, 
external causes bringing about a radical enough change in this proportion, alter the essence 
of the human body. Since by changing essence the human body loses its identity and is 
thereby destroyed, the external causes bringing about this change are evil. Thus, preser-
vation of the essence of the human body is life, which is good, while destruction of this 
essence is death, which is evil.
In the scholium to the proposition, Spinoza elaborates on his definition of death. Since 
death is the loss of identity due to change in essence, the death of one individual is the birth 
of another. This definition of death is a revisionary and not descriptive one: as the famous 
case of the Spanish poet shows, the circulation of blood and other features of the body by 
which the layman identifies the poet as still living is maintained, yet since he has changed 
essence he has died and a new person has been born. It must be noted that however perfect 
and powerful is the resulting new individual born from the death of the previous one, for 
the previous individual its death is always evil. For a horse, it is equally evil to change into 
an insect or into a man (E4prae).
Since the essence of the human body, the persistence of which is life, is the conatus 
(E3p9s), death, the destruction of the conatus, cannot come about by a cause internal to 
the human body, only external to it (E3p10). As Spinoza explains in E4p20s, this external 
cause could destroy the essence of the body in many ways: by directly destroying it (e.g.: 
when a sword is plunged in one’s chest), by affecting its imagination though hidden exter-
nal causes changing its nature (e.g.: when someone believes that it is better for her to be 
dead than alive), or by creating such an environment that a quick death is preferable to 
dying slowly (e.g.: when Nero orders the suicide of Seneca).
So, propositions E4p39 and E3p10 together provide the definition of death, which is: 
the destruction of the essence of the human body brought about by a harmful external cause.
2.  Universal intelligibility: there is no such 
external cause of which we cannot form 
an adequate idea
It is a general feature of Spinoza’s philosophy that he is committed to universal intelligibil-
ity, which was noted by scholars emphasizing his use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
(Della Rocca 2008), as well as his commitment to realist rationalism (Renz 2010). This 
strong commitment is the most evident in E1a1–2: here Spinoza states that everything is 
either in itself, or in another (E1a1), which allows for its understanding either through itself 
or through another (E1a2). Since we have an adequate idea of what is in itself – God’s es-
sence – (E2p47) we are able to know everything that depends on and follows from God’s 
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essence, which is of course everything there is (E1p25c and its use in E5p24d). Therefore, 
we can form in principle an adequate idea of any modification of the body (E5p4) and of 
external bodies (E5p14).
These propositions together imply the principle of universal intelligibility: since we un-
derstand an effect through its cause (E1a2), and we have an adequate idea of God’s essence 
(E2p47), and that everything follows from God’s essence (E1p25) – including external 
causes – there is no external cause of which we cannot form in principle an adequate idea. Of 
course, the question remains whether we actually form adequate ideas, but this question is 
independent of whether we have epistemic access to the idea.
3.  Ethical intellectualism: that from which we 
form an adequate idea cannot be harmful
Spinoza states in E5p3 that as soon as we form an adequate idea of a passion – because 
something being a passion entails having an inadequate idea of it (E3d2–3) – it ceases to be 
passion and becomes an action. An action follows from our nature and therefore is always 
useful and not harmful (E4p38–39, E4app3, E4app6). What is harmful is evil and is the 
result of inadequate ideas (E4p64). These propositions together imply ethical intellectual-
ism: whatever we have an adequate idea of cannot be harmful or evil.
If we take these three claims together the following conclusion seems inevitable: if an 
individual y has x as its cause of death, x has to be an external cause to y (by 1), y has to be 
able to form an adequate idea of x (by 2) and therefore y has to be able to turn x into an 
action (by 3) which rules out x as a cause of death (by 1). Since this can happen to any x, 
it is not necessary that y dies.
4. It is necessary that human individuals die
The problem is that according to Spinoza humans necessarily die. That he wants to main-
tain this claim is evident from E2p10, which states that the being of substance does not 
pertain to the essence of man, and from E2p31c, which states that all particular things are 
contingent and corruptible. However, Spinoza does not state clearly that it is necessary to 
die. I assume that the general line of argument shows that in Spinoza’s view, humans nec-
essarily do die. I will consider the option that he thought that humans are contingent par-
ticulars capable of an indefinitely long life in section 6. His unwillingness to state the ne-
cessity of death might be the consequence of his views that the free man should not think 
about death (E4p67), and that the mind strives not to imagine those things that diminish 
the body’s power of acting (E3p12–13). More probably, this can be the  consequence of his 
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inability to prove the necessity of death with the resources of his system. He comes close 
to proving it in E4p4:
It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be 
able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his 
own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause. Dem. […] if it were pos-
sible that a man could undergo no changes except those which can be understood 
through the man’s nature alone, it would follow (by IIIP4 and P6) that he could 
not perish, but that necessarily he would always exist. […]
Here Spinoza wants to demonstrate precisely the impossibility of the scenario presented at 
the end of the previous section, i.e.: that humans can avert death indefinitely. According 
to the demonstration humans could avert death either by their own power, or because it 
follows from the common order of nature as a kind of “accident”. The refutation of both 
options is problematic.
The refutation of the second option goes as follows:
…if it were possible for a man to undergo no changes except those which could 
be understood through the man’s nature alone, so that (as we have already shown) 
he would necessarily always exist, this would have to follow from God’s infinite 
power; and consequently (by IP16) the order of the whole of Nature, insofar as it 
is conceived under the attributes of extension and thought, would have to be de-
duced from the necessity of the divine nature, insofar as it is considered to be af-
fected with the idea of some man. And so (by IP21) it would follow that the man 
would be infinite (E4p4d).
The claim is that if someone would not have any passions because of the common order of 
nature, then the common order of nature would be deducible from her nature and there-
fore would be an infinite mode.
This argument has two shortcomings. First, E1p21 does not say that the whole order of 
nature can be deduced from infinite modes, even less so the claim that only from infinite 
modes can the whole order of nature be deduced. The entailment of the common order of 
nature by infinite modes is itself a hotly debated topic (cf. Garrett 1991; Curley–Walski 
1999).
Second, this move implies that the practically impossible ideal of the free man who has 
only adequate ideas (E4p66cs) is also theoretically impossible. Since the free man has only 
adequate ideas he would be free of passions and would not be acted upon. This is problem-
atic because given Spinoza’s treatment of modal terms, impossibility implies either contra-
diction in essence (e.g. square circle), or unactualized possibility. Spinoza does not seem to 
allow for unactualized possibilities (E1p17c2s). But then the only option left is that the free 
man, our ethical ideal, is an inconsistent concept, like a square circle! But even if we accept 
that the free man is an unactualized possibility, he could hardly serve as an ethical ideal, 
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since he would be of a different metaphysical category. We humans are finite modes, while 
he would be an infinite mode.3
The first option, that a human being by her own power could avoid passivity, is refuted 
by appealing to E4p3 according to which “The force by which a man perseveres in exist-
ing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes”. The problem with 
this proposition is that its demonstration refers back only to E4a1 which, being an axiom, 
is not argued for, and simply states that however powerful a mode, if enough other modes 
join together they can be more powerful. So Spinoza is not able to provide systematically 
grounded reasons for ruling out this option.
There is a further concern: the proposition says that “it is impossible that a man […] be 
able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature 
alone, and of which he is the adequate cause” (E4p4). Making the claim this way only 
rules out the possibility that one is absolutely free, namely that one has no passions at all. 
However, it leaves open the possibility that while one always has some mild passions and is 
saddened here and there, one never suffers from such a dramatic external effect that would 
bring about her death. That is, even if Spinoza’s demonstration would be successful, the 
best he could demonstrate is that it is necessary that humans have passions.
5.  Could Spinoza reject universal intelligibility 
or ethical intellectualism?
So far I have argued that Spinoza embraces claims that together imply that he cannot ac-
count for the necessity of death. Also, his account for the necessity of death suffers from 
three main shortcomings: (1) it does not demonstrate the necessity of death, only the neces-
sity of passivity, (2) the refutation of the option that one does not die because of the com-
mon order of nature implies that the ideal of the free man is inconsistent, (3) the lack of 
refutation of one’s potential option to avert death indefinitely by way of one’s own power. 
I argue that this shows that accepting universal intelligibility and ethical intellectualism 
when combined with the identification of the logical and psychological aspects of the idea, 
results in Spinoza’s inability to explain the necessity of death. In this section I argue that 
both doctrines are central tenets of Spinoza’s philosophy and therefore he could not give 
them up without giving up Spinozism.
(1) Giving up ethical intellectualism would give us the following picture: an individual 
can know her cause of death, but knowing does not allow her to avert it. This view might 
3  To be fair, this would be an intended result in the Medieval context, since there the ethical ideal is the 
conjunction with the active intellect (Black 1999) which has the same metaphysical category as the in-
finite modes in Spinoza. Yet, the free man and the active intellect play quite different ethical roles: in 
conjunction the subject becomes identical with the active intellect, while the free man as an ideal only 
helps to align our actions with our rational interests (Kisner 2010).
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seem plausible given Spinoza’s necessitarianism (cf. E4app32). Also, the common sense im-
plausibility of the claim that pain ceases as soon as we form an adequate idea of it has been 
stated (Alanen 2012, 250). Given Spinoza’s formulations, he could modify his system in 
two ways: either by claiming that the set of actions and adequate ideas are not coextensive, 
or by giving up the claim that actions are never harmful. The first would make the defini-
tion of action meaningless (E3d3), since then there would be no distinction between action, 
passion and affect. Also, this could not be reconciled with the parallelism doctrine (E2p7). 
In this doctrine, for every mode of thought there is an extended mode, with which it is iden-
tical. Therefore, for every adequate mode of thinking following from the essence of the hu-
man mind alone there will be an extended mode following from the essence of the human 
body alone. Because of the conatus doctrine, these extended modes cannot be harmful and 
thus have the same systematic role as action on the official theory. Therefore, the distinction 
between action and passion follows from parallelism, the conatus doctrine and the identifi-
cation of epistemic value with epistemic autonomy. The second option, namely, admitting 
harmful actions, might have some plausibility given Spinoza’s account of rational suicide 
and the wording of E4p59 (Nadler 2016). But this option entails giving up the conatus 
doctrine, since in this case something would follow from our nature alone that is harmful to 
us (Grey 2016). That is, Spinoza’s ethical intellectualism is entailed by his conatus doctrine, 
his parallelism doctrine and his identification of epistemic value with epistemic autonomy.
(2) Spinoza could give up universal intelligibility. This would give us the following pic-
ture: an individual can know everything except her cause of death. Spinoza could argue for 
this restriction of universal intelligibility in two ways: first, by restricting the scope of pos-
sible objects of understanding; and second, by restricting the time-frame of understanding. 
The first option would be that some objects are by definition unintelligible for the subject. 
A good candidate for such a restriction would be objects of the idea which excludes the 
existence of the subject’s body. The second option might be called the Epicurean solution: 
death is such a violent disruption of the essence of the body that we do not have time to 
understand it; once it is here we are gone.
The problem with these proposals is twofold. First, they are hard to reconcile with the 
textual evidence. E5p4 states that we can form adequate ideas of every modification of 
the body. Since death was defined as a disruption of the essence of the body, it qualifies as 
a modification of the body. Also, in E4p59 Spinoza states that “To every action to which 
we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason, with-
out that affect”. Here action could not mean the technical term “what follows from our 
nature alone”. Rather, it must refer generally to an event happening in or outside of us (cf. 
E3d2). Since death is a bodily modification, it is an action in this sense and therefore we 
can be motivated to it by reason, i.e. adequate ideas. (This is also compatible with Spinoza’s 
analysis of different types of suicide, see: E4p20s.)
Second, there is the more general problem that restricting intelligibility would intro-
duce a brute bifurcation in the system. Although the exact role of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason in Spinoza is debated, the debate is not about the question of whether Spinoza 
admitted a brute bifurcation in his system, rather, about what qualifies as a brute bifurca-
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tion (Della Rocca 2008, 2010; Renz 2010; Melamed 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Restricting 
the scope of intelligibility this way could qualify as a brute bifurcation and would certainly 
disqualify Spinoza from being a rationalist (Renz 2010, 14–15).
To sum up, in this section I have argued that Spinoza’s inability to account for the ne-
cessity of death comes from his acceptance of universal intelligibility and ethical intellectu-
alism, together with the identification of the logical and psychological aspects of the idea. 
In my view, the doctrine of universal intelligibility is so fundamental to Spinoza’s project, 
that giving it up would entail giving up Spinozism. Ethical intellectualism, especially when 
coupled with the identification of the logical and psychological aspects of the idea, does not 
seem to be either very plausible or necessary for Spinozism. In fact, as I have shown in the 
introduction, Sangiacomo has argued that it is not even part of the philosophy of a mature 
Spinoza. While it is true that the intellectual aspect in Spinoza’s mature thinking is affec-
tive and not purely conceptual, in this section I have argued that giving up ethical intellec-
tualism is only possible by abandoning either the conatus doctrine, or the identification of 
epistemic value with epistemic autonomy. And both are fundamental tenets of Spinozism.
6.  Analogous problems in the medieval 
philosophy of intellect
The relationship of intellect and imagination – that is, the relationship of epistemological 
values and the psychological states in which they were embodied – was also a relevant prob-
lem for the Arabic and Hebrew philosophy that partially constituted Spinoza’s philosophical 
context. These philosophers – Maimonides (Nadler 2014), Gersonides (Klein 2003; Mela-
med forthcoming; Harvey 2012; Klein 2014), Shem Tov ben Shem Tov (Adler 2014), Elijah 
Del Medigo (Licata 2013; Fraenkel 2013, 2011) – tried to solve the problem generated by 
the seemingly inconsistent claims of Aristotle’s De anima.4 There Aristotle distinguished 
two types of intellect: the active and the material intellect. The material intellect does not 
have a nature but can become anything (DA III.5 430a10–15). That is, the material intellect 
can be informed by every form and thus it can potentially understand anything. In con-
trast, the active intellect is distinct, unaffected, unmixed and in essence, activity: the giver 
of those forms which inform the material intellect (DA III.5 430a15–20). Aristotle else-
where also claimed that unqualified intellect alone can survive death (DA I.4. 408b20, II.1. 
413a5–10, III.5. 430a20–25), and that it is unmixed and unaffected (DA III.4 429a18–20).
There are two ways in which these claims can naturally be understood (Davidson 1992). 
The first way was proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Aphrodisias 2014a, 2014b). He 
focused on the metaphysical implications of Aristotle’s claim about the unmixed nature of 
the intellect. In Aristotle’s physics, if something is unmixed with and distinct from matter, 
4  References to Aristotle’s work is to this edition with the usual abbreviation (Aristotle 1993).
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it is an incorporeal and eternal form. Given its eternality, this interpretation goes along well 
with Aristotle’s claim that this is what survives death. However, it faces the problem that 
in Aristotle’s metaphysics, instances of the same species are individuated by matter. Given 
that this eternal intellect is unmixed, it cannot be individuated, thus it is one of a kind. 
But there are multiple epistemic subjects in the universe, and something has to distinguish 
their mental operations. Therefore, in Alexander’s view, the intellect that is unmixed and 
eternal is the active intellect only, which he identifies with God. And the material intellect, 
which does not have a nature, is in his view, the disposition of the corruptible soul to accept 
the intellectual forms provided by the active intellect.
The alternative view was proposed by Themistius (1990). In Alexander’s theory the in-
tellect that remains after death is the active intellect, which is actually God, and  therefore 
the human soul is corruptible. Themistius wanted to avoid this conclusion and there-
fore he focused on Aristotle’s claim that the unqualified intellect is unmixed and therefore 
eternal. This solves one problem: if the material intellect, as well as the agent intellect 
is eternal, then everyone has a unique immortal soul. But then he has to explain how is 
potentiality possible in an eternal substance and what individuates the numerically differ-
ent intellects.
These two interpretations also have bearings on the question of the mind’s ability to 
understand. Aristotle clearly linked the unmixed character of the intellect to its ability 
to understand everything. In Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, understanding something 
is to become identical with it: just as the eye becomes red when perceiving red, the intellect 
instantiates the (intellectual) form of apple when understanding the apple. Therefore, in the 
same way as the eye must lack color in order to be able to perceive all colors, the intellect 
cannot have any form in order to be able to know all things, i.e. to acquire any possible form. 
The problem is that neither of the two interpretations can account for this formless pure po-
tentiality, which constitutes the problem of the material intellect that generated much of the 
discussion in the scholastic philosophy of mind, in both Arabic (Davidson 1986) and He-
brew (Visi 2012). Themistius cannot explain how something purely potential can be eternal, 
while Alexandros cannot explain how a disposition of a corruptible being can lack nature.
I have argued elsewhere that Spinoza’s distinction of intellect and imagination was in-
fluenced by his Medieval predecessors (Tóth 2016a, 2016b). Here I would like to argue that 
Spinoza’s problem stems from a problem similar to the one of the material intellect. Al-
though, as we have seen, he tried to solve the difficulties of his early ethical intellectualism by 
turning concepts into affects (Lenz 2013); this did not rule out ethical intellectualism, but 
only gave it an affective twist.
Originally, the problem was that Spinoza identified intellect and will, and therefore he 
could not explain error: as we have seen in section 2, everyone has the source of knowledge 
(i.e. the idea of the essence of God) which is sufficient for knowing everything. So why 
are people mistaken? Why are we not omniscient? This problem was solved by turning 
ideas into affects: their epistemic status, i.e. their role in our web of belief and our reasons 
for action, became a function of their power. But this solution came at a high price. Now 
Spinoza could explain the source of error with the power of ideas, i.e. with affectivity: the 
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powerful inadequate idea can defeat the less powerful adequate idea. However, he could 
not explain how we can understand everything. Since ideas ceased to be mere representa-
tions, a class of ideas became the wrong kind of ideas: those ideas that represent harmful 
objects are just the wrong kind of idea to have. And those ideas that represent lethal objects 
are just the kind of ideas that one cannot have.
Spinoza accepts that there is a conformity of causes and effects: the same object pro-
duces the same kind of effect in the same subject with the same constitution. The same 
music will always be delightful to the same subject, unless the constitution of the subject 
has changed, e.g. she begins to mourn (E4prae).
Spinoza also accepts that causes can be beneficial or harmful depending on their effects 
on the human body. This is, of course, to a large extent determined by the current state 
of the human body. That is, based on how the human body is constituted, the potential 
causes can be categorized either as harmful, or as beneficial.
Some of the harmful causes produce such effects that they exclude the existence of 
the human body. These are the lethal effects. Perhaps the lethal nature of some of these 
effects are contingent on the condition of the human body, and therefore can turn into 
beneficial effects by appropriately modifying the state of the human body. This could hap-
pen in a similar manner to the change that occurs when the mourning person turns into 
a melancholy person and therefore the music that was previously harmful turns into music 
that is beneficial.
One might argue that all of the lethal effects are such. One way in which this change in 
the body’s constitution may come about, is by acquiring knowledge. Thus, one could say 
that with knowledge, all lethal effects can be mitigated. The problem with this reading is 
that it implies that we do not necessarily have to die. Also, it seems implausible that there 
are no effects that are actually contrary to human nature: when the big fish eats the small 
fish (TTP 16.2), it is not the result of a terrible misunderstanding; the big fish has a nature 
that is actually contrary to the nature of the small fish.
To be fair, it is not obvious that this option was all that counter-intuitive for Spinoza. As 
we have seen in section 4, he might not have stated explicitly that human individuals neces-
sarily die because he really thought that all lethal actions can be mitigated by knowledge. 
He might have embraced the claim that in a perfect world, big fish do not eat small fish and 
humans do not necessarily die.5 In religious thinking neither of these claims is unheard 
of. Maimonides asserts in a much-discussed place of his Guide that intellectual knowledge 
saves the sage even on the battlefield.
If man frees his thoughts from worldly matters, obtains a knowledge of God in the 
right way, and rejoices in that knowledge, it is impossible that any kind of evil should 
befall him while he is with God, and God with him. When he does not meditate on 
God, when he is separated from God, then God is also separated from him; then he 
is exposed to any evil that might befall him; for it is only that  intellectual link with 
5  I would like to thank Ursula Renz for raising this objection.
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God that secures the presence of Providence and protection from evil accidents. 
[… if] you should happen to pass on your way a widely extended field of battle and 
even if one thousand were killed on your left and ten thousand on your right, no 
evil at all would befall you (Maimonides 1974 III. 51; cf. Nadler 2014).
Also, in the Scripture, end times are often characterized by the metaphor of carnivores and 
herbivores living together peacefully. E.g.:
The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the 
kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall 
lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down 
together: and the lion shall eat straw like the ox (Isiah 11:6–7).
Therefore it might be the case that Spinoza took these claims literally and developed a phi-
losophy according to which acquiring knowledge really has such wonderful consequences. 
But in my view this is not the case: since contrariety and agreement in nature correlate with 
similarity and dissimilarity, the cow and the bear should cease to be two different species 
in order to live peacefully together (cf. Wilson 2002).
The other option is to accept that some lethal effects are generated by causes that will 
always generate lethal effects in humans no matter what. But then the human body will al-
ways strive against these effects and the human mind will strive against having their ideas. 
And since we know external bodies by the ideas of their effects (cf. Lenz 2012), the human 
mind will strive not to know them. That is, the fact that the human body has a particular 
nature – on the basis of which natures with beneficial effects and natures with harmful ef-
fects on the human body can be distinguished – makes it impossible for the human mind 
to acquire ideas of those natures which have lethal effect on the human body. In fact, the 
human mind will do everything in its power not to know them.
I claim that this problem is analogous with the problem of the material intellect. In 
scholastic philosophy, the material intellect had to be free of any nature in order to be able 
to know everything; and then, no one was able to account for this pure potentiality. In 
Spinoza’s philosophy, the mind had to be able to conform to all natures in order to know 
them, but only something devoid of nature can conform to any nature. In both cases the 
determinate nature of the subject precludes universal intelligibility. This problem, because 
of the identification of epistemology and affectivity, manifests itself in Spinoza’s system 
through his inability to demonstrate the necessity of death.
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